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Shortage of nurses is a problem in several countries. It is an unsettled question whether
increasing wages constitute a viable policy for extracting more labor supply from nurses. In
this paper we use a unique matched panel data set of Norwegian nurses covering the period
1993-1997 to estimate wage elasticities.  This data includes detailed information on 18,066
individuals over 5 years totaling 56,832 observations. The estimated elasticity when
controlling for individual and time invariant fixed effects is significantly positive but not very
high in magnitude. Individual and institutional features are significant and important for
working hours. We have also access to information about contractual arrangements. It turns
out that shift work is important for hours of work, and that omitting information about this
common phenomenon will underestimate the wage effect.
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1. Introduction.
The health sector is labor intensive with a continuous and high demand for highly trained and
specialized labor. Several countries suffer to a varying degree from a shortage of key health
personnel. This is particularly relevant for nurses, and both UK and Scandinavian countries
report scarcity of nurses within the hospital sector as well as in other parts of the public health
sector. Remedies are not clear. In Norway, the nurses’ unions claim that wages are too low,
making the nurses unwilling to participate or work sufficiently long hours to meet stated
demands for nursing. Thus, in Norway 40% of the nurses work part time. Several studies
report low wage elasticities for nurses, see Antonazzo et al (2000) for a survey of US and UK
studies. Anecdotal evidence often hints at an unwillingness of nurses to work longer hours,
and that several decide to leave nursing altogether. A problem with existing studies is that
they are often based on cross sections, and with missing information about variables of
importance for the nurses’ work decisions. In this paper we use a unique panel data set of
Norwegian health care personnel to investigate the labor supply of nurses. We have access to
information about individual characteristics, including the health care institution to which the
nurse is affiliated, actual working hours, wages and type of contract for each nurse.
Wage policy may be of importance for the health sector if it can actually contribute to
remedy the labor scarcity problem. For a work group like nurses there should be reasons to
believe that increased wages may actually contribute to increasing nurses’ labor supply.
Surprisingly, the evidence to some degree seems to be to the contrary. On a general level,
several labor market studies indicate positive labor supply elasticities for females, i.e., the
positive substitution effect outweighs the negative income effect, see Killingsworth and
Heckman (1986) for an overview. Since a large share of nurses is female, it might be expected
that such results would carry over to nurses’ labor supply. Furthermore, nurses do to a large3
degree work part time, which should make changes in individual labor supply easier than for
groups of workers on ordinary full time contracts. Existing empirical studies, often based on
cross sections, reveal quite small, and sometimes even negative, effects of wages on nurses’
labor supply (see Link, 1992, Ault and Rutman, 1994, Phillips, 1995). Does this mean that
female nurses behave differently from female workers in the general population? Or could it
be that low wage elasticities are due o the omission of relevant features of the labour markets
for health personnel? These omitted features may be job attributes or contractual
arrangements. It could also be that the selection problem is at work in explaining why nurses,
when deciding on hours of work, are not very sensitive to wage changes.
There are several econometric issues at hand. Firstly, wages cannot be considered as
exogenous in a labor supply equation. In the UK and Scandinavian countries the market for
health personnel to a large degree consists of one or a few large buyers. Thus, the labor
market may resemble elements of a monopsonistic labor market, an issue well addressed in
the literature (see e.g. Hirsch and Schumacher (1995, 1998)). In a monopsonistic labor
market, the buyers, hospitals and other community health institutions, face an upward sloping
supply curve. This implies that they consider the marginal incremental cost of increasing
wages rather than the wage rate itself. This means that the buyer faces a marginal cost which
is steeper than the wage curve. Thus, even though the hospitals claim that they would employ
more workers at the going rate, it is not for certain that they would be willing to pay the
additional cost from increasing the wage of all nurses. This may be of particular relevance in
an institutional setting where the demand side of the labour market faces more or less a given
budget. The later is the case in most public health care systems. We do not attempt to control
for monopsony tendencies in the labor market as such. However, by controlling for institution
and type of work performed, we may capture some effects from a non-competitive labor
market since the availability and attractiveness of the different institutions matter for choice of4
employer. Furthermore, using instrumental variable estimation we take into consideration the
simultaneous determination of wages and hours of work, thus singling out demand effects of
importance for wage determination.
Secondly, several studies may be alleged to suffer from an omitted variable problem.
Nurses work under quite different contractual arrangements. Notably, quite often they work
shift hours, which affect contractual working hours as well as hourly pay. Shift hours are
generally compensated with an hourly wage premium, and it is generally such that the
mandated weekly working hours are shorter for shift workers. We believe that it is important
to correct for shift work, and that the wage effect will be biased if a variable representing such
contractual work arrangements is omitted. The reason is twofold. If shift hours are considered
burdensome, a wage compensation is required (Moore and Viscusi, 1990). If this
compensation is insufficient, lower labour supply is offered, and the estimated wage effect
will be downwardly biased. It may also be the case that shift workers just consider it too
demanding to work long hours, and that they respond less to wage changes than those
working on ordinary day time contracts. In this case, the derived wage effect underestimates
the true effect for some groups, and may give the wrong signals when considering an
appropriate wage policy for nurses.
Thirdly, when investigating labor supply, care should be taken to control for selection
and unobserved heterogeneity. There is likely to be a selection process driving the decision to
work or not to work, as well as where to work. Since we only observe nurses holding a job in
specific health care institutions, not controlling for selection will result in biased estimates.
Similarly, labour market behaviour is also driven by individual characteristics only some of
which are observed by the researcher. A panel data set will make it possible to correct for
selection bias as well as unobserved heterogeneity.5
We have access to a unique panel data set of Norwegian health personnel covering the
period 1993-1997. The individualized data with information about wages, working hours and
type of work are matched with other data sets including information about the individual and
its household. We can also track trained nurses that are temporarily or permanently employed
outside of the public sector. The matched data set is suitable for addressing the important
question of nurses’ labor supply in a consistent manner. For nurses employed by local and
regional municipalities, information on wages and working hours are collected by the
Norwegian Association of Local and Regional Authorities  (NALRA) for one month
(October) during each year. Statistics Norway provides information on background variables
for all registered nurses during the relevant period. We have controlled for the type of position
held by each individual, and for the fact that nurses on shift contracts have shorter mandated
working hours. In particular, a variable representing the burden of shift work is highly
significant, and contributes in itself to a negative effect on working hours. Thus, the inclusion
of variables representing contractual arrangements is warranted, as is the inclusion of
individual and institutional controls.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we provide some
background information on the labor market for nurses. The data and sample properties are
presented in Section 3. In Section 4 we derive the empirical specification and discuss some
empirical modelling issues. Results are presented in Section 5, while Section 6 offers some
concluding remarks.6
2. Institutional features of the labor market for nurses.
According to OECD Health Data 2000, Norway is one of the countries with the highest
density of nurses. In 1996 there were 14,9 registered nurses per 1000 inhabitants
1,
outnumbering most other countries. Simultaneously, the Norwegian nurses’ union claims
there are more than 4000 full time vacancies. The number of nurses includes registered nurses
only, i.e. auxiliary nurses are excluded. The difference between registered and auxiliary
nurses is length and type of education. Registered nurses receive 3 (4) years of education at
college, whereas auxiliary nurses are trained at the secondary school level. From the mid
eighties a shift in the composition of nursing labor in favor of registered nurses has taken
place especially at hospitals. In the rest of this paper we confine ourselves to registered
nurses.
In Norway, most nurses are employed by publically owned institutions. Similar to
other Scandinavian countries and the UK, the public sector is responsible for finance and most
of the production of health care services
2. Specialist services are the responsibility of counties.
Somatic and psychiatric hospitals are owned and financed by 19 counties. Exceptions include
two national and some private, specialized hospitals. Primary health care is the responsibility
of municipalities but a considerable share of general practitioners run private practices.
Nurses employed by these private practices are not in our data set, nor are nurses engaged by
private specialists. Municipalities are also responsible for general public health services, and
institutions for the elderly, including somatic and psychiatric nursing homes. Counties and
municipalities are financed from risk adjusted grants from the government using local taxes,
                                                          
1 The comparable numbers for 1997 are 9.5 registered nurses per 1000 inhabitants for  Norway and Germany, 4.5
for the UK and 5.9 for France.
2 In 1997, according to OECD Health Data 2000, 82,7% of expenditures on health were public and only 0,1% of
hospital beds were in private institutions.7
and to a minor degree from user charges (co-payment). Owners of somatic hospitals
(counties) also receive activity dependent DRG based payment. It is fair to say that the public
health institutions are facing periodic (yearly) budget limits, but it is a matter of perception as
to how strict these budget restrictions are. This is a fact of some importance when deriving
wage effects. Given a fixed budget, institutions may not be willing to let nurses work longer
hours following a wage increase. A phenomenon also hinted at in the monopsony theory
approach to the nursing labor market.
Wages are bargained by the nurses’ union on the one side, and NALRA, representing
municipalities and counties, on the other side. Bargaining takes place every year. There may
also be bargaining once a year at a local level, and each institution will have some discretion
in bargaining individual wages by putting workers into specific wage categories. The
bargained tariffs determine wage scales for every position and work category, including shift
and overtime compensations. Individual contractual working hours are determined at the
specific institution, at which level it is also determined who and how many to employ. Thus,
the bargaining process resembles a ‘right-to-manage’ framework. Commonly, positions are
offered as full time or as a given share of full time, and as shift work or ordinary day work.
Overtime is only paid when weekly hours of work exceed full time working hours (37.5 hours
for ordinary work and 35.5 hours for shift work per week). Nurses are not allowed to plan for
overtime work but may of course work overtime in cases of particular demand.
3. Data.
The data used in this analysis consist of administrative data for the years 1993-1997 collected
from different official data registers. Statistics Norway (SSB) provides detailed background
information on all individuals who have completed their nursing education. The data from8
SSB include information on whether the individual works or not, where the individual works
and yearly income. However, this data set does not include information about wage rates or
the number of hours worked. Information about the latter is obtained by merging the data
from SSB with data from NALRA’s personnel register
3. The NALRA register includes
information on all individuals working in the health sector in Norwegian counties and
municipalities. An important advantage of this register is that it contains very detailed
individual information on standard wages, overtime, compensation for work outside normal
hours, and total number of hours worked. Furthermore, information about the workplace of
the nurse (hospital, nursing home, etc), and kind of job, like staff nurse, ward nurse etc., is
also included. Using register data should reduce the problems associated with measurement
errors which usually plague survey type data
4.
Our sample covers the period 1993-1997. We include female nurses younger than 62
years of age who are registered with a completed nursing qualification and employed by
municipalities or counties
5. Nurses working in institutions which do not provide detailed
information for all years were excluded. We will argue below that this limitation of the data
set does not seriously affect the representativeness of our analysis. We have detailed wage and
contractual information on 18,066 individuals over five years, totaling 56,832 observations.
This sample constitutes about one half of the relevant population of Norwegian nurses. In
Column 1 of Table 1 we report the number of observations each year for the total sample of
female nurses. From Column 2 we see that the share of the nurses out of work is relatively
constant over time, at approximately 8%. Almost 90 percent of the nurses are employed by
                                                          
3 Notice that the data in the NALRA register is collected only for the month of October each year. The data for
this month is considered representative, since there are no public holidays and it is not a typical holiday month.
4 Validation studies use administrative data to examine the presence and magnitude of measurement errors in
survey data (see for e.g. Poterba and Summers (1986) and Bollinger (1998)).
5 We have excluded male nurses (4613). Inclusion of male nurses will have a marginal effect on our results.
Nurses older than 62 (1400) are excluded since they will have access to different pension schemes. Also nurses
registered with more than one job in the health sector is excluded (2743).9
institutions covered by the NALRA register, see Column 3. Lastly, Column 4 includes nurses
working in institutions which have provided detailed and consistent wage information.
(Table 1 about here)
In Table 2 we report the frequency of the number of years worked by each nurse. Obviously,
those who have not been at work in any of the five years cannot be found in the NALRA
register, explaining the missing observations in the first row. Comparing the samples, we see
that nurses are observed for fewer periods in the NALRA samples than in the total sample of
female nurses. The reasons are threefold. Firstly, an individual may work for all years but
may temporarily leave a specific institution covered by the NALRA registers. Secondly, a
specific institution may not file adequate reports for all years. This will affect the number of
observations in the most restricted sample. Thus, missing observations in the NALRA sub
sample are not due to choices of individual nurses but lack of reports from an employer.
Thirdly, an individual may leave the labor force for on or more years. As shown below, there
seems to be little variation in the characteristics of nurses among the samples.
(Table 2 about here.)
The variables used in the analysis are defined in Table 3 and further explanation of some of
these variables is given in the Appendix.
(Table 3 about here)10
Sample statistics are reported in Table 4. If no figure is reported, it means that there are no
observations for that variable in that sample. We immediately observe that the individual
specific variables (age, experience, number of children, etc.) are very similar over the
samples. The geographical variables, on the other hand, indicate an under-representation of
nurses in central areas in the NALRA samples. In fact, most government owned institutions
are situated in the capital and private health care tends to be over-represented in major cities.
It is also the case that large hospitals and municipalities are less likely to report the necessary
information for all years to the NALRA register. It total, barring a slight geographical
misrepresentation, the data in the restricted sample seems representative for the total sample
of female nurses.
(Table 4 about here)
4. Econometric model
We will consider the following model:
it i it it x y ε α β + + =
* ;      N i ,..., 1 = ;      T t ,..., 1 = ,                                    (4.1)
it i it it u z d + + = η γ
*                                                                                     (4.2)
1 = it d  if  1
* = it d , 0 otherwise.                                                       (4.3)
The unknown parameters we wish to estimate are β  (and γ ), while  it x  and  it z  are vectors of
explanatory variables. All variables in  it z  and  it x  are assumed to be strictly exogenous
6 and
it z  and  it x  might contain common elements. The  it ε  and  it u  are unobserved disturbances.
                                                          
6 We consider the case where  it x  is allowed to contain endogenous variables below.11
The sample selection problem arises because the variable 
*
it y  is only observable for
individuals with  1 = it d . If  i α  and  it ε  are dependent on  it d , the conditional expectation of
(4.1) will differ from  β it x . Applying OLS on the observation for which 
*
it y  is observed will
therefore lead to biased estimates of the β  vector. If the sample selection process is constant
over all periods a difference estimator eliminates the sample selection bias. In this case both
the unobserved individual effect and the sample selection effect are differenced out.
To correct for sample selection we use the estimator proposed by Kyriazidou (1997).
The individual effects,  i α  and  i η , are fixed and are allowed to be correlated with the
explanatory variables ( it x  and  it z ) and the error terms ( it ε  and  it u ). No distributional
assumptions are made concerning the error terms. The estimator relies on time differencing
(4.1) for those observations that have  1 = = is it d d ,  s t ≠
7. This strategy will eliminate the
individual-specific component but not the sample selection effect, unless the conditional
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, 1 | E it
                                         (4.4)
Here  () i i is it is it i z z x x η α ζ , , , , , = . To see that this may not necessarily equal zero, notice that
the sample selection effect in period t, may be expressed as
() i i is is i it it it it z u z u E ζ η γ η γ ε λ , , | + ≤ + ≤ =
      () () i is it it it i is i it u u F z z ζ ε η γ η γ | , , ; , + + Λ = .
                                                          
7 Our panel consists of five periods, thus the maximum number of differences is ten.12
We see that the sample selection effect depends on the conditioning vector  i ζ  and the joint
conditional distribution of the error terms. Since this distribution may vary over individuals,
as well as over time for the same individual, there is in general no reason to expect the
unobserved conditional expectation in (4.4) to equal zero. To ensure the sample selection
effect are the same in two periods, it is assumed that Λ  is time invariant
8. If this is the case,
it λ  and  is λ  will be equal only if  γ γ is it z z = . Thus, applying first-differences in equation (4.1)
eliminates both the fixed effect and the selection effect. Notice that since first-differences are
taken on an individual basis, the functional form of Λ  may vary across individuals.
In most cases  γ it z  and  γ is z  will not be exactly equal. However, differencing across
observations when the values of  γ it z  and  γ is z  are close, will also approximately eliminate the
unobserved expectation. Thus, to make the estimator operational, Kyriazidou (1997) suggests
the following procedure. In the first step, get consistent estimates of the parameters in the
selection equation. In this study, we estimate a conditional logit model using only the
individuals who change status over time. In the second step, these estimates are used for
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K is a “kernel density” function, and  n h  is a sequence of “bandwidths” that tends to zero as
∞ → n .
So far all variables in  it x  and  it z  are assumed to be strictly exogenous.  However, a
straightforward generalization by Charlier, Melenberg and Van Soest (1997) allows for
endogeneity in the Kyriazidou method using an IV estimator
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where () is it x x ˆ ˆ −  are the instruments. This IV estimator will also eliminate a potential
endogeneity problem due to measurement errors (see Dustmann and Barrachina, 2000).
5. Results.
Most of our discussion will concentrate on the estimated effect of wages on labour supply.
The results are given in Table 5. The first column reports the OLS results, while the second
column corrects for simultaneity in wage determination by applying a standard IV estimator
(2SLS). Column three includes results from a fixed effects  (FE) model, while column four
has its IV counterpart (FE-IV). Similarly, the results in column five and six are based on
                                                          
9 Charlier, Melenberg and Van Soest (1997) prove the consistency of this estimator.14
sample selection models using Kyriazidou’s method  (K) and its IV counterpart after
instrumenting for wages (K-IV).
As instruments for wages of nurses we have used the mean wages of auxilliary nurses
working in the same institution as the nurse, and the nurse’s work experience. These
instruments pass the Hausman test of overidentifying restrictions
10. The corresponding results
for the wage equations are reported in Table A1.
(Table 5 about here)
We note that apart from the wage elasticity and the variables representing the type of job, the
coefficient estimates are reasonably stable over the different models. Age has a non-positive
and concave effect, i.e. the nurses work shorter hours as they become older. The effect of
family variables are as expected. Being married and having children have a negative impact
on hours of work, as has spouse and non-labor income. Nurses working in psychiatric
institutions work longer hours compared to the base category somatic hospitals, whereas labor
supply is smaller in home nursing, and in nursing homes. Lastly, perhaps somewhat
surprisingly, labor supply is highest in the least central areas but the relationship with
centrality and labor supply is not monotonic.
Compared to a staff nurse, a senior nurse works longer hours according to the models
that do not control for endogeneity in wage determination. Instrumenting for wages yield the
opposite effect. Senior nurses work shorter hours. This highlights the importance of demand
side effects for actual hours of work. This may be due to the type of contracts the nurses are
offered. Also, that health institutions play an important role in setting working hours.
In the rest of the discussion we concentrate on the wage variable. From the OLS model
in column 1 we find a highly significant wage elasticity of 0.253. Being on shift work has a15
negative effect on hours of work, -0.016, and so does the effect of being on a contract with
less contracted working hours per week (hour_35, -0.046)). Thus, in addition to wages, the
type of contract on which a nurse is engaged, is important for deriving labor supply effects.
Omitting these variables will lead to biased estimates. The interpretation of the shift work
variable is that it represents the degree of burden by working shift. In the OLS estimate the
included second order effect, shift work 2, is positive, indicating that the burden is decreasing
in share of overtime. This result is questionable, and its sign changes after controlling for
endogeneity in wage determination.
The empirical labor market literature draws particular attention to three potential
problems that may bias the simple OLS results. These are sample selection problems,
unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity of the wage variable. Another common problem is
related to measurement errors. However, by using register data and not survey data, we should
be much less exposed to the latter. However, we cannot rule out measurement problems
because there still could be mistakes in reporting from health institutions. A priori, we have
no reason to assume such mistakes to be systematic in any direction. Column 2 of Table 5
shows the results of a 2SLS estimator that instruments for wages. The effect on the wage
elasticity is large, whereas the other variables are almost unaffected. The wage elasticity
increases to 0.843, which is higher than what is found in several other studies cited earlier.
The coefficient for the variable representing burden of shift work is higher than that of OLS,
now at –0.02. However, the second order effect is negative, as we would expect, i.e., shift
work will reduce hours of work, and the more time devoted to shift work, the stronger is this
effect.
To control for individual heterogeneity, we apply the fixed effects (within) estimator.
From column 3 of Table 5 we see that the estimated effect of the wage is smaller than that of
OLS, with a wage elasticity of –0.024, though not significant at a 5% level. The variable
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controlling for shift work has an effect similar to the OLS estimates, and is significant.
Controlling for endogeneity in the wage variable by a fixed effect 2SLS estimator, column 4
(FE-IV), the wage elasticity increases much more dramatically than for OLS and results in a
wage elasticity of 0.781, slightly lower than that for 2SLS in column 2. Note that the fixed
effect 2SLS estimator gives reasonable results in the sense that more variables are significant
and have the expected sign. In particular this is true for the wage variable as well as the
second order effect of shift work.
So far, sample selection is controlled for only through the individual effects. However,
this may be based on a too restrictive assumption. Verbeek and Nijman (1992) propose simple
tests for sample selection in panel data models. One test is to include variables measuring
whether the individual is observed in the previous period (V1), whether the individual is
observed in all periods (V2) and the total number of periods the individual is observed (V3).
The null hypothesis says that this kind of information should not give any information about
the unobservables in the model. Another test, a Hausman type test, compares the fixed effects
estimator from the balanced sample as opposed to an unbalanced sample. Since both tests
reject the null hypothesis of no sample selection
11, we consider a model that explicitly takes
sample selection into consideration.
To implement the estimator of Kyriazidou (1997) we estimate a conditional logit
model in the first step. We only use the 7959 individuals who change status over time. The
results are given in table A2. In the regression we use a number of variables characterising the
municipality where the individual lives. Job-related variables are excluded since we do not
observe this information for those who do not participate. These estimates are then used to
construct “kernel weights”. We have chosen a normal density function for the kernel, while
the bandwidth is set to 
5 / 1 − ⋅ = n h hn . Kyriazidou proposed a plug-in procedure to obtain the17
optimal kernel bandwidth. However, Experimenting with different values of h, had very little
effect on the estimates in the final regression.  Finally, these weights were used in a weighted
least square regression. To take account of the weights, we apply the Huber/White estimator
for the variance. The results are given in column 5 of table 5. In column 6 in the same table,
we present the results of the IV-counterpart proposed by Charlier, Melenberg and Van Soest
(1997).
The results from the sample selection models indicate that the wage elasticities change
only moderately from the FE model, now being only marginally smaller and equal to 0.78 for
(K-IV). The variables representing shift work show similar results to what was found in the
other specifications, i.e., a significantly negative effect as is expected with a negative second
order effect for the K-IV estimatorl. However, before controlling for endogeneity, the wage
elasticity is significantly negative, at –0.037. This is possible but not very likely. Thus, with
tests showing that the instruments are valid, and given the signs and levels of significance for
central variables, we conclude that the model in Column 6 gives the best representation of the
nurses’ labor supply. Taking into consideration that there is selection into work, and having
controlled for type of contracts, and endogeneity in wage and hours-of-work decision, we find
that wage elasticities are positive and significant.
6. Concluding remarks.
Based on studies of nurses’ labor supply in the UK and USA, there are ample evidence
indicating that nurses’ wage elasticities are small. We have found that this is indeed the case
in our panel data set of Norwegian nurses. This result obtained whenever we did not take into
                                                                                                                                                                                    
11 The estimates of V1, V2 and V3 was (standard deviations in parenthesis); V1: -0.026 (0.008), V2: 0.002
(0.003) and V3: -0.023 (0.002). The result of the Hausman type test was: chi2( 21) = 63.37 (p-value: 0.00).18
consideration the endogeneity of wage determination. It is interesting to note that this result
came about in a fixed effect models, i.e., after controlling for nurses' heterogeneity, and it also
occured after correcting for sample selection. However, we have shown that important effects
may relate to the simultaneous determination of wages and hours of work. This may be due to
the role played by the demand side in the labour market for nurses, which is represented by
hospitals and other institutions that are publically owned (municipalities and counties), and
which are likely to have some degree of market power in their local labor markets. Correcting
for sample selection does not dramatically change the estimates of the wage elasticities.
Another important result form the analysis is that contractual information should be
included in the analysis of health personnel’ labor supply. Omitting information about shift
work and which kind of job is performed, will bias the estimates of the wage elasticity. The
reason is that the work contract specifies working conditions and payment, including standard
hours of work and compensation for work outside of normal working hours.
The magnitude of the wage elasticity depends on the estimator chosen. A wage
elasticity of 0.7 to 0.8 is higher than many previous studies have found, but it is still not very
high. It may be sensitive to the instruments used, although tests here show that our
instruments are valid. Interestingly, with a wage elasticity of the magnitude we have found, a
considerable wage increase may actually help overcome some of the problems related to
shortage of nurses.19
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Data appendix.
The hourly wage is calculated by first adding the monthly basic income, overtime pay and all
bonuses, and then dividing this total income by the number of hours worked. Bonuses include
compensation for shift work on evenings, nights and weekends, and regular bonuses. Regular
bonuses are typically compensation for meetings or other work outside normal working hours,
mostly paid to ward nurses and leading nurses. Finally the wage is discounted by a price
index.
Shift work is calculated as the share of total monthly income that a nurse receives as
compensation for shift work. Another possibility would be the proportion of hours worked
outside normal hours (shift hours divided by total hours of work). However, we do not have
information about the actual number of shift hours, but believe that shift work is a close
substitute for the exact magnitude of individual shift work. An advantage of calculating the
importance of shift work this way, is that it implicitly takes into consideration that shift work
of different types may be differently compensated due to variations in the burden of this
particular type of work.
Hour_35.5 is a dummy variable taking value 1 if the nurse is on a shift contract implying 35.5
hours per week, 0 otherwise.
The nurses in our sample are divided into four categories: staff nurse, specialist nurse,
ward nurse and leading nurse. Staff nurses have 3 (4) years of college education. Specialist
nurses are nurses with at least one year of specialist training, in e.g. anaesthesia, surgery or
intensive care. Ward nurses are nurses who are in charge of a ward, whereas leading nurses
are in charge of a larger unit.
Centrality indicates the geographical position of the municipality in relation to larger
urban settlement. The classification is performed by Statistics Norway and it is based on22
traveling time to a center where a higher order of central functions is found. “Centrality level
0” consists of the least central municipalities, whereas the most central municipalities are
found in “Centrality level 3”.23
Table 1. Number of observations each year.
Total sample Out of work NALRA sample NALRA sub sample
1993 28722 (18.1) 2344 (8.1) 19392 (18.0) 10378 (18.3)
1994 29984 (18.9) 2503 (8.4) 19861 (18.4) 10928 (19.2)
1995 31526 (19.8) 2599 (8.2) 21277 (19.7) 12442 (21.9)
1996 33403 (21.0) 2607 (7.8) 22954 (21.3) 11291 (19.9)
1997 35255 (22.2) 2879 (8.2) 24421 (22.6) 11793 (20.8)
Total 158890 (100) 12932 (8.1) 107905 (100) 56832 (100)
Table 2. Sample frequencies by number of work years.
No. of  years Total sample NALRA sample NALRA sub sample
0 1180 (3.1) - -
1 3561 (9.4) 4777 (14.6) 4144 (22.9)
2 3596 (9.5) 4864 (14.8) 2725 (15.1)
3 3552 (9.4) 4702 (14.3) 3089 (17.1)
4 4766 (12.6) 5423 (16.5) 2569 (14.2)
5 21097 (55.9) 13068 (39.8) 5539 (30.7)
Total 37752 (100) 32824 (100) 18066 (100)24
Table 3. Variable definitions.
Variable name                                                         Definition
Hours per year Regular hours plus overtime.
Hourly wage Hourly wage included all bonuses and overtime in NoK.
Shift work Share of the monthly income that is bonus due to late, night and
weekend duties.









Disable 1 if the individual is more than 50 percent disabled, 0 otherwise.
Non labour income Spouse’s income + capital income (respondent and spouse).
Number of children Number of children younger than 18.
Children < 3 1 if the nurse have children aged 3 or younger, 0 otherwise.
Children 3-7 1 if the nurse have children between the ages of 3 and 7, 0 otherwise.
Children > 7 1 if the nurse have children older than 7, 0 otherwise.
Married 1 if the respondent is married or cohabitant with children, and 0
otherwise.












Centrality: Measures a municipality’s geographical position related to the nearest
centre with central functions.
Centrality level 0 (least central)
Centrality level 1
Centrality level 2
Centrality level 3 (most central)
County Categorical variable for living in one of 19 Norwegian counties.25
Table 4. Sample statistics, means and standard deviations (in parentheses).
                                                        Total sample                         NALRA sample             NALRA sub-sample
Hours per year - - 1375.6 (364.8)
Hourly wage - - 127.5 (16.7)
Shift work - - 11.9  (8.24)
Hour_35.5 - 0.80 (0.40) 0.84 (0.37)
Disable 0.02 (0.15) 0.01 (0.10) 0.01 (0.10)
Age 37.3 (8.14) 37.1 ( 8.04) 37.1 (7.94)
Age2 1457.3 (645.2) 1444.6 (634.3) 1439.6 (624.2)
Non labour income 197.9 (320.5) 198.9 (315.1) 201.3 (237.7)
Single 0.37 (0.48) 0.36 (0.48) 0.34 (0.47)
Number of children 1.20 (1.13) 1.17 (1.10) 1.19 (1.09)
Children < 3 0.22 (0.42) 0.22 (0.41) 0.22 (0.42)
Children 3 – 7 0.28 (0.45) 0.28 (0.45) 0.29 (0.45)
Children > 7 0.31 (0.46) 0.31 (0.46) 0 .32 (0.47)
Hospital - 0.52 (0.50) 0 .60 (0.49)
Psychiatric - 0.03 (0.18) 0.04 (0.20)
Home nursing - 0.12 (0.33) 0.09 (0.29)
Health service - 0.07 (0.25) 0.05 (0.21)
Nursing home - 0.21 (0.41) 0.19 (0.39)
Other - 0.04 (0.20) 0.03 (0.17)
Nurse - 0.57 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49)
Nursing specialist - 0.22 (0.41) 0.22 (.42)
Ward nurse - 0.19 (0.39) 0.16 (0.37)
Senior nurse - 0.02 (0.13) 0 .01 (0.12)
Experience 13.8 (6.87) 14.0 (6.73) 14.0 (6.63)
Centrality level 0 0.12 (0.33) 0.14 (0.35) 0.14 (0.35)
Centrality level 1 0.11 (0.32) 0.13 (0.34) 0.09 (0.30)
Centrality level 2 0.22 (0.41) 0.24 (0.43) 0.34 (0.47)
Centrality level 3 0.54 (0.50) 0.48 (0.50) 0.40 (0.49)
County 1 0.05 (0.21) 0.05 (0.23) 0.08 (0.27)
County 2 0.10 (0.30) 0.09 (0.28) 0.09 (0.29)
County 3 0.12 (0.33) 0.08 (0.26) 0.01 (0.08)
County 4 0.04 (0.20) 0.05 (0.21) 0.07 (0.26)
County 5 0.04 (0.20) 0.05 (0.21) 0.06 (0.24)
County 6 0.05 (0.20) 0.05 (0.22) 0.04 (0.20)
County 7 0.05 (0.20) 0.05 (0.22) 0.07 (0.26)
County 8 0.03 (0.18) 0.04 (0.19) 0.03 (0.17)
County 9 0.03 (0.16) 0.03 (0.16) 0.04 (0.20)
County 10 0.03 (0.18) 0.03 (0.18) 0.01 (0.13)
County 11 0.08 (0.27) 0.08 (0.27) 0.11 (0.32)
County 12 0.10 (0.29) 0.09 (0.29) 0.04 (0.21)
County 14 0.02 (0.14) 0.02 (0.15) 0.02 (0.16)
County 15 0.06 (0.24) 0.07 (0.26) 0.01 (0.12)
County 16 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.25) 0.10 (0.30)
County 17 0.04 (0.19) 0.04 (0.19) 0.05 (0.22)
County 18 0.05 (0.22) 0.06 (0.24) 0.06 (0.25)
County 19 0.04 (0.20) 0.05 (0.21) 0.02 (0.17)
County 20 0.02 (0.13) 0.02 (0.14) 0.03 (0.17)
Sample size 37752 32824 1806626
 Table 5. Estimated effects on nurses labor supply.








































































































































































































































































































































































































































Number of observations 56832 56832 56832 56832 81503 81503
Standard errors in parentheses. 
** and 
* is statistically different from zero at one and five percent significance
level, respectively.27
Table A1. Wage equations.


























































































































































































































Number of observations 56832 56832 81503
Standard errors in parentheses. 
** and 
* is statistically different from zero at one28
and five percent significance level, respectively.
Table A2. Participation equation. Conditional logit.
Educated as nurse  -0.87142
** (0.08793)




Non labour income  -0.00007   (0.00005)
Single  -0.16311
** (0.06338)
Number of children  -0.25570
** (0.05589)
Children < 3  -0.15501
** (0.05148)
Children 3 - 7   0.13301
** (0.04642)
Children > 7  -0.06290   (0.04561)
Disable -1.02578
** (0.25131)
County1   0.18511   (0.29488)












County9  -0.14414   (0.29677)
County10 -1.44914
** (0.28018)
County11   0.15060   (0.25233)
County12 -2.15470
** (0.24975)
County14  -0.02445   (0.31239)
County15 -3.41621
** (0.30475)







Hospital in municipality   0.37002
** (0.07635)
Small city   0.79373
** (0.13009)
Large city   0.33443
** (0.12943)
Large municipality  -0.35300
*  (0.18107)
Medium municipality  -0.43313
** (0.16614)
Number of observations 44568
Standard errors in parentheses. 
** and 
* is statistically different
from zero at one and five percent significance level, respectively.